Target2 para miúdos

Um dos debates mais esotéricos da blogosfera e da comunidade académica ‘económica’, em torno dos desequilíbrios de pagamentos entre bancos centrais, continua ao rubro. Desta vez é Paul de Grauwe a responder a Hans Werner Sinn. TARGET2 as a scapegot for german errors, no Vox.

Before the debt crisis, German banks had been willing to lend massive amounts to the rest of the Eurozone. Since the breakdown of the interbank market in the Eurozone, this risk has been shifted to the Bundesbank. We have argued that this shift has not affected the risk for Germany as a whole. With or without TARGET2, the risk that arises from reckless lending by German banks will have to be borne by Germany. Again, it is all too easy to look for a scapegoat outside of Germany.

Adenda: recomendada também a leitura de uma nota técnica do CEPR acerca do TARGET2, bem como de um ‘paper’ mais desenvolvido escrito em co-autoria por um economista do BCE.

Em defesa da união bancária

Charlez Wyplosz explica hoje, no Vox, o que está em causa com uma união bancária. Banking union as a crisis managment tool.

It is essential to understand that a partial banking union is no better than no banking union at all, and possibly worse. Imagine that we only have a single regulator and that the common supervisor only looks at large banks. Imagine that a series of governments, small and large, restructure their public debts, an occurrence that many regard as unavoidable. Because banks typically hold large amounts of national bonds, a public-debt restructuring is likely to cause deep losses in small and large banks. The 2007-8 scenario has amply shown how mutual suspicion promptly steps in and brings the interbank market to a halt. The ECB must then provide liquidity to individual banks, small and large. In addition, some banks may fail, bringing along others. The ECB is facing its role as lending in last resort. If it only supervises large banks, it cannot provide liquidity and, if need be, emergency assistance to the smaller banks. Financially hard-pressed governments will need to provide resources that they do not possess and cannot even borrow. Healthier governments may start down the road followed by Ireland and Spain and find themselves losing market access as well. Large banks too will be engulfed. With no resolution authority, the ECB will not feel able to inject amounts that could reach several trillions of euros. Apocalypse now.