Não é muito fácil perceber o que vai lá por dentro. À partida, o Syriza podia jogar a cartada do louco: utilizar o seu saldo primário para ameaçar um default e a fragmentação da Zona Euro, obtendo financiamento pela chantagem. Ou podia aproveitar as expectativas irrealistas criadas com a sua eleição para adoptar uma postura responsável e procurar uma solução de compromisso com a Alemanha (quanto mais pressão houvesse para exigências irrealistas, mais fácil seria ganhar credibilidade através de uma proposta moderada).
Mas a actuação do Syriza parece demasiado errática para se enquadrar em qualquer uma destas alternativas. Num dia, o ministro das Finanças dispensa a Troika e anuncia uma nova era; no seguinte, caminha de mão estendida a pedir um novo empréstimo da Zona Euro. O Governo tanto apresenta propostas realistas e razoáveis de reestruturação da dívida como abre os noticiários com discursos inflamados no Parlamento. O que é que se passa na cabeça do Syriza? Uma resposta possível, por Tony Yates: Syriza’s communication strategy.
1. There is a remarkable amount of cross-section variation (ie across different Syriza representatives) and time-series variation in what is being demanded or proposed. We have had variation on how to treat legacy debt; the difference between G and T going forwards (the primary surplus), and even who would be dealt with.
2. This makes me think that they had not thought through clearly what they would say they would do or wanted, nor what they would actually do and accept.
3. If that’s the case, perhaps they were caught out by how many seats they won, and had only wargamed on the assumption that they would have to form a centre-left coalition and water down their demands at the outset, at the point of coalition-formation, ie before confronting the Troika.
4. If 3 was right, that would account for why the detail behind the more robust demands was not there, and why the tough line was hard to maintain.
5. All this is a shame, because as many have observed, even if there is an agreement to be had, the dispute could still end in Grexit by accident.
6. And there is no real excuse for not being prepared. There was and is plenty of free help around to plan everything thoroughly.
7. I’d say that this cross-section and time-series variability in Syriza demands makes a bad outcome more likely.
8. The Troika might take it as a sign of weakness, take heart, and try to ram home a solution too close to the status quo, which ultimately fails.
9. Or this could be a sign Syriza don’t really know what they would settle for, nor what they could deliver.
10. A more forgiveable reason for the shifting talk is that what can be delivered, or what might have to be accepted is shifting, as capital flows out of Greece, and tax collection collapses.
11. You can see how this creates an unfortunate feedback loop. Uncertainty about what Syriza wants causes capital to fly, taxes to fall, which causes what Syriza can achieve/deliver to scale back, which causes the rhetoric to change, and so on.