O tema dos ‘defaults’ e reestruturações continua a dar que falar. Ugo Panizza escreve acerca do tema, defendendo um mecanismo engenhoso que permite evitar a ‘procrastinação da reestruturação’ – a tendência de países em crise e financiadores oficiais, natural tendo em conta a estrutura de incentivos, para adiar ao máximo o momento em que se admite que a dívida é insustentável e se procede à reestruturação. Em baixo, alguns excertos de Incentives for avoiding delayed sovereign defaults, que não dispensam a leitura do artigo completo.
An alternative system that maintains the automaticity of Weder and Zettelmeyer’s (2010) proposal, but allows for country heterogeneity could work as follows. Countries that approach the international lender of last resort for support are immediately subjected to debt, fiscal, and external sustainability analyses. Countries that are deemed to face a solvency problem will not receive any support and will be de facto forced to restructure their debts. If the situation appears to be sustainable, or if the country is deemed to be able to achieve sustainability in the medium term, the country will receive the necessary support. Support will come with the announcement of country-specific criteria and thresholds3. If these thresholds are breached, support will be immediately and unconditionally withdrawn, and the country will be de facto forced into default (unless markets have suddenly become optimistic).
This proposal is different from standard conditionality for at least two reasons. First, while standard conditionality tends to include a large number of indicators, the approach proposed here would include a small number of easily verifiable indicators. Second, and more important, in international lender of last resort programmes there is usually a sequential bargaining game. The international lender of last resort starts by setting tough conditions which are then renegotiated if the crisis country overshoots the original targets. In my proposal, there is full commitment. If a country overshoots the pre-established thresholds, the international lender of last resort is forced to withdraw support.
If support is withdrawn and debt restructuring becomes necessary, the insolvency mechanism will start its work by verifying claims, allowing for interim financing, and imposing an immediate cessation of payments and stay on enforcement. Next, the mechanism will determine seniority among commercial creditors by following the guidelines of Bolton and Skeel (2004).